Tag Archives: invalid requests

Don’t Overlook These Beneficial Changes Made In The OPRA Reform Law

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The provisions of the recent OPRA amendments that have gotten the most attention are new sections dealing with attorney fee awards, commercial requests, and authorization of suits against requestors who seek to interfere with government operations. These are important, but today I want to focus on other significant revisions that have been somewhat under the radar.

Over the years, OPRA’s unclear language, or in some cases, the absence of language, caused several problems in implementing the statute. The new law addresses many of these issues. Here are a few examples of these beneficial changes:

-Since OPRA’s original enactment, it’s been unclear whether the statute’s privacy provision required custodians to redact individuals’ personal information, particularly home addresses and personal email addresses, from government records. This ambiguity led to much litigation over the years, and as I’ve often noted, the case law has not resulted in much clarity. The new law resolves this problem by expressly stating when address information must be kept confidential. And the statute specifically overturns the Supreme Court’s untenable interpretation of the privacy section in the Bozzi case, where the Court determined pet owners have no expectation of privacy when they apply for a pet license, and therefore their home addresses must be disclosed.

-Custodians constantly struggle with responding to overly broad requests that don’t identify specific records, and instead require custodians to conduct research to satisfy the request. Although the courts have consistently stated that such a request is invalid, requestors keep making this type of request. The amended statute now expressly says that requests involving research are invalid, and more specifically defines what’s needed for a request to be valid.

-One of the most problematic aspects of the courts’ interpretation of OPRA has been that a person who is litigating against an agency, with the opportunity to obtain agency records through discovery, is allowed to separately submit an OPRA request with that agency, seeking the same records. The new law expressly precludes litigants from doing this.

-Unlike all other state agencies (and the courts), the GRC does not have a deadline for a requestor to file a complaint with the GRC, giving a requestor an unlimited amount of time to challenge a custodian’s OPRA request. The statute resolves this absurd situation, imposing a 45-day period for filing GRC complaints.

A Significant Court Ruling: A Prolific OPRA Requestor is Not Allowed to Make OPRA Requests

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Over the past several years, an organization named the African American Data and Research Institute (AADARI) has been a frequent OPRA requestor and litigant. I don’t know how many requests AARDI has made, but it often files challenges to OPRA denials in the GRC and the courts. About half of the cases decided by the GRC in recent have listed as the complainant, “Rotimi Owoh, Esq. (o/b/o African American Data & Research Institute).” And the AADARI, always represented by Mr. Owoh, has litigated a number of Appellate Division and Supreme Court OPRA cases.

However, the Appellate Division recently held that the AADARI does not have the legal capacity to make OPRA requests or to authorize an attorney to act on its behalf, either to make OPRA requests or to file litigation. AADARI v. Hitchner, et al.

This case involved various OPRA and common law requests made by Attorney Owoh on behalf of AADARI. However, the record before the Appellate Division showed that AADARI is a corporation whose sole member is Owoh’s son, O.S., who suffers from a mental illness and is mentally incompetent. The court concluded the corporation did not have the legal ability to take any of the actions involved in the OPRA matters. The corporation can only take actions through its members, but AADARI’s only member, O.S., is not able to do so because of mental incompetence; according to the court, he “does not possess the capacity to retain Owoh, request the records, or decide to file suit.”

For the same reason, the court said, the corporation lacks the legal ability to file an OPRA court action. The entity cannot satisfy the court rule that its action be supported by the required verified complaint –no one in the corporation could attest to the truth of the claims. As a result, the Appellate Division dismissed the complaints.

It’s not clear what effect this ruling will have on future OPRA litigation. The AADARI could, of course, reorganize with new members to remedy the problem discussed above. But for now, this frequent requestor is precluded from making OPRA requests or litigating over prior denials of its purported requests.

Appellate Division Issues Useful Opinion on OPRA’s Exemption for Investigations in Progress

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The Appellate Division’s recent unpublished opinion in Benigno v. Office of the State Comptroller doesn’t break any new ground, but it contains helpful reminders of the legal standards that govern some common OPRA issues.

The requestor sought records concerning an investigation by the Office of the State Comptroller (OSC) into the training provided by the requestor’s company, “Street Cop Training,” to various police departments. (It’s not relevant to the OPRA issues, but here’s an article discussing the OSC’s report alleging the company conducted problematic training sessions).

The court upheld the denial of the request on various grounds. The records were confidential under OPRA’s exemption for an “investigation in progess.” The Appellate Division discussed how the records met all the criteria for this exemption: at the time of the request, the OSC was engaged in an investigation; the requested records were created as part of this investigation; and it would be “inimical to the public interest” to reveal the OSC’s “investigative playbook” to the party being investigated.

The court also held that the request was invalid as an overbroad request for information. The request consisted of demands for “all” documents, correspondence, etc. related to the investigation. As I’ve noted before, requestors keep making this type of improper request, even though the case law has consistently said that OPRA does not allow this.

Finally, the Appellate Division rejected the requestor’s effort to obtain the records under the common law, concluding that the need for confidentiality of the investigation far outweighed any interest in disclosure.

Once Again, Appellate Division Rules That A Request Requiring Research Is Invalid

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It’s a bedrock OPRA principle, stated consistently by the courts, that a request must be for a specific record, and cannot require the custodian to conduct research to fulfill the request. For this reason, the Appellate Division recently upheld the denial of a request that sought the “real reason” for the separations of various police officers from employment. Owoh v. Maple Shade Police Department.

The request asked the police department for personnel information that’s not exempt from disclosure under OPRA–the “[n]ames, date of hire, date of separation and reason for separation and salary of
individuals who…[were separated] in the last [five] years from [the] police department.” The department provided the requested information. For the reasons for separation, it properly indicated whether the officer resigned, retired or was terminated.

The requestor objected that this did not show the “real reason” for separation, which might be due to a plea agreement or a conviction. The court rejected this argument, concluding that the department complied with OPRA by giving the requestor the reasons for the officers’ separations.

Regarding the requestor’s interest in finding the so-called “real reasons” for officers’ separations from employment, the court indicated that the custodian was not obligated to try to figure out what records might contain such information. The court emphasized that the request did not identify any specific records that have the “real reasons,” and the custodian was not required to conduct research and analyze the agency’s records to attempt to find this information.

Appellate Division Discusses the Proper Way to Handle an OPRA Request Sent to the Wrong Agency

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In Owoh v. City of Camden, the Appellate Division recently dealt with what it characterized as a “case of mistaken identity”–the requestor asked the City of Camden for records of the County of Camden. The request sought various police department records from the City, but since 2013, the City has had no police department, and the County Police Department handles all policing in the City. The court held that the request in question could only be answered by the County, the public entity that maintains the records in question.

After reaching this unremarkable conclusion, the court dealt with an issue that is of interest to all record custodians–the obligations imposed by OPRA when a request is submitted to an agency that isn’t the custodian of the record. According to the Appellate Division, this situation is governed by OPRA’s requirement that the person in receipt of the request must either “forward the request to the custodian of the record or direct the requestor to the custodian of the record.”

The court rejected requestor’s argument that the City was required to respond to its misdirected request by obtaining the records from the County. As the court pointed out, OPRA does not require this. The City here followed the plain language of the statute, by directing the requestor to the proper custodian; it notified the requestor that the County was the custodian of the records sought, and gave a County phone number to contact with reference to the request.